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is opportunity to cross-examine these statements, there is simply no
purpose in excluding them as substantive proof provided they meet
the other criteria for admissibility.
loel V. Williamson

TORTS-NEGLIGENc-DuTY

TO WAm

iN PRODUCT LIABILIY CASES-

Wilbur Post was injured when the fan of an industrial vacuum
cleaner, designed for 115 AC voltage, disintegrated as the result of
his plugging it into an outlet supplying 220 DC voltage. The equipment was furnished to Post's employer by an out of state corporation'
through a local distributor. Written instructions accompanying the
machine warned the user that serious damage to both machine and
operator might result from use of the wrong voltage. The manufacturer had included a 21/2" x 11" decal bearing the inscription
"ONLY USE ON 115 VOLTS AC OR DC" for attachment to the
equipment. In addition, it had affixed a metal plate to the vacuum
bearing the serial number of the machine and the words "VOLTS
115" The plate had been mentioned in the written instructions.
Under an instruction which made no reference to a duty to warn

and contained no definition of an adequate warning, the jury found
in favor of the manufacturer. Post appealed. Held: Reversed. The
judge should have instructed the jury that there was a duty to give
an adequate warning to all foreseeable users. Post v. American Clean-

ing Equipment Corporation,437 S.W.2d 516 (Ky. 1968).
Manufacturer's liability for product-caused injuries may be based
on contract or tort law. In the latter, actions are predicated on either
negligence or strict liability. Within specific areas of product liability
such as product design and the duty to warn, negligence still remains
the prevalent theory of liability.2 Recently, however, there have been
a few cases applying strict liability for a failure to provide an adequate
warning to the user.3
3 The Court discusses the jurisdiction question and Kentucky's "doing business" statute, Ky. Bxv. STAT. § 271.610(2) (1946), and rules that the concept of
"doing business," as discussed in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310 (1945), is no longer applicable in product liability cases where the doctrine
of strict liability has been adopted. The Court cites Annot., 19 A.L.R. 3d 13 as
authority.
Note that the Court is implying that Post is a strict liability case.
2
Note, Foreseeabilityin Product Design & Duty to Warn Cases-Distinctions
. Misconceptions, 68 Wis. L. ER-v. 228 (1968).
3 See e.g., Canifax v. Hercules Power Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr.

552 (1965).
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The concept of product liability has evolved from the early
English case of Winterbottom v. Wright4 to the modem view of
MacPhersonv. Buick Motor Company5 and Greeman v. Yuba Power
Products.6 Since the 1906 case of Heindirk v. Louisville Elevator
Company,7 tort authorities in Kentucky have agreed that when a
manufacturer markets a defective article which is "imminently" or
"inherently" dangerous, he will be liable for any resultant injury,
unless notice of the inherently dangerous quality is given.8 The
Kentucky Court, in an attempt to escape the confines of the privity
doctrine established in Winterbottom, later implied that deceit had
to be shown before recovery could be allowed.9 In so doing, the
Kentucky Court recognized an exception to the "general rule" set
forth in Winterbottomo which had held that the original manufacturer
or vendor of goods was not liable for injury caused by his negligence
to anyone except the original vendee. The Kentucky Court's exception to this rule held the seller liable to any person who suffers an
injury which might have been reasonably anticipated by the seller,
unless notice had been given of the "imminently" dangerous qualities
of the product.1
Subsequently, the scope of liability was expanded by charging
the manufacturer with implied notice of the quality of the article
he had produced. 12 The Court also distinguished between "imminently" and "inherently" dangerous articles; the dicta limited
4152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). This case stood for the "general rule" that
the original maker or seller of goods was not liable for injury caused by his
negligence to anyone except the original buyer.
5217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). Judge Cardozo stated the modem
rule which is adopted by the Restatement of Torts § 395, that the manufacturer is
liable for harm caused by lawful use of a product which was not carefully made,
thus creating an unreasonable risk of harm to those lawfully using it for the purpose
for which it was manufactured.
659 Cal. 2d 63, 377 P.2d 897 (1963). A manufacturer is strictly liable in
tort when an article he places on the market contains a defect that causes injury
to a human being.
7 122 Ky. 675 92 S.W.608 (1906).
8 See also Pullman Co. v. Ward, 143 Ky. 727, 137 S.W. 233 (1911); Berger
v. Standard Oil Co., 126 Ky. 155, 103 S.W. 245 (1907).
9id.
10 See J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co. v. Huset, 120 F. 865 (8th Cir. 1903),

summarizing the exceptions to the "general rule" of the Winterbottom case. Kentucky seemed to follow the third exception: where one sells or delivers an article
which he knows to be imminently dangerous, because defective, without giving
notice of its qualities, he is responsible to any person who suffers an injury therefrom which might have been reasonably anticipated. (It must be noted that the
Court confuses terms and uses imminently" meaning "inherently.")
11 See Pennington, Manufacturers' Liability in Kentucky, 42 Ky. LJ. 273,
274-75 (1954).
12 Old's Motor Works v. Shaffer, 145 Ky. 616, 140 S.W. 1047 (1911). Kentucky seemed to have been anticipating the MacPherson case. See also Rankin v.
Harlan Retreading Co., 298 Ky. 461, 183 S.W.2d 40 (1944).
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"inherently" dangerous articles to poisons, explosives and drugs while
implying that "imminently" dangerous products were those which
were dangerous due to defects in manufacture.13 In later developments, the Court indicated that a manufacturer who places either an
"inherently" or "imminently" dangerous product in commerce will be
liable to any injured party who had no warning of the defect 1 4 These
later results manifested the Court's development of negligence as the
basis for liability.' 5
In 1925, the Court held for the first time that the duty to warn
extended to persons not in privity with the manufacturer."8 In other
words, if the manufacturer could forsee that one with knowledge of
the danger might permit others to use the defective product, this
intervening act or omission would not necessarily relieve the manufacturer of liability to a third party.17 Thus, the warning to the purchaser was not enough; the Court declared that it had to be extended
to all foreseeable users.
Concern with the foreseeability of the manufacturer eventually
led the Kentucky Court to extend the MacPherson rule to allow
recovery by a pedestrian who was injured as a result of a defective
automobfle.' 8 Finally, in 1956, the Court apparently discarded its
preoccupation with exceptions to the privitv doctrine and applied
straight negligence concepts to product liability cases.' 9 Prior to
1966, in order to recover for product-caused injuries, a plaintiff had
to have expert knowledge of production techniques in order to demon13 Old's Motor Works v. Shaffer, 145 Ky. 616, 624, 140 S.W. 1047, 1051

(1911).

14Peaqlee-Gaulbert Co. v. MeMath's Admr., 148 Ky. 265, 146 S.W. 770
(1912). This case involved a seller, not a manufacturer; however, different rules
were indicated for each. Here, as in the Ole's Motor case, it seems that the Court
was anticipating the decision in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.
15 Pennington. supra note 11. at 276.
'8 Kentucky Independent Oil Co. v. Schnitzler, 208 Ky. 507. 271 S.W. 570
(1925). The Court held the defendant liable for the death of the consumer
caused by an explosive mixture of gasoline and kerosene sold as kerosene, although
the retailer had been warned that the container contained the mixture. It must be
noted that this case was also decided without a showing of deceit. Comvare with
Ford Motor Co. v. Atcher, 310 S.W.2d 510 (Ky. 1957) where the Court limited
the manufacturer's liabilitv to a duty to warn the purchaser. See also 2 F. HA'aPn
& F. JAmEs, TnE LAw oF TORTS 1542-44. Professor Tames acclaims the Kentucky
Independent Oil case and states that the rule limiting the duty of the manufacturer
is "avestigal carry-over from pre-MacPherson days when deceit was needed for
recovervY Id.
17 208 Ky. at 517, 271 S.W. at 573.
18 Gaidrv Motors v. Brannon, 268 S.W.2d 627 (Ky. 1954). It is interesting
to note that Kentucky extended the MacPherson rule beforp fully accenting it.
19 C. D. Herme, Inc. v. R. C. Tway Co.. 294 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1956). 'or a
more exhauqtive dikcussion of the case, see Oberqt. Recent Developments in Torts,

Derdelons of The Court of Appeals at The 1956-57 Terms. 46 Ky.I..

(1958),

194, 202

,
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strate the manufacturer's negligence.2 0 However, the Court in Dealers

Transport Company v. Battery Distributing Company2' reduced this
burden considerably by abolishing the privity requirement between
the ultimate consumer and the manufacturer. The consumer was

thus able to sue the manufacturer for negligent construction and
breach of implied warranty. Of even greater consequence was the
Court's adoption of the modern doctrine of strict liability as a basis
for recovery in cases involving dangerously defective products. 22
Until Post, however, the Kentucky Court had not decided a case
involving the duty to warn and the foreseeable misuse of nondefective products.23 In most jurisdictions, a manufacturer may be
held liable for negligent failure to give adequate warning to the

user,24 not only for dangerous design, but also for dangers inseparable
from a normally non-defective product.2 5 The manufacturer is also
2

0 Davis Red Rock Bottling Co. v. Alsip, 287 S.W.2d 594, 595 (Ky. 1956);
Nehi Bottling Co. v. Thomas, 236 Ky. 684, 33 S.W.2d 701 (1931).
21402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1966). This case was cited in Post as authority
concerning the jurisdiction question. For a more lengthy discussion of this case,
see Torts, 1967 Court of Appeals Review 55 Ky. L.J. 453, 472 (1961).
22402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1966). Ad'opting § 402A of the BE~mim REsTATEmENS OF -m LAw OF TORTS, the Court stated that a manufacturer who:

. sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the
seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is
expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold . . . although . . . (a) the

seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from
or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
23
See E. I. DuPont de Nemours v. Wright, 146 F.2d 765 (6th Cir. 1944).
Interpreting Kentucky Law, the Federal Court implied a concern for protection
arising from the foreseeable misuse of a non-defective product. The Court still
adhered to the "deceit" exception due to a change in the type of container which
was unknown to the plaintiff. However, they were primarily concerned with the
failure to warn of the danger of mishandling the product in its new container.
The Court stated:
Our conclusion is that the danger inherent in subjecting the appellant's
black container to the customary handling of drums of nitro-cellulose by
lacquer manufacturers in the Louisville district, including their liability
to spark when skidded, was foreseeable by the appellant, and so a direct
casual relation existed between the failure to warn the consignee of such
danger and the injury which followed unbroken by any fault of the
consignee in handling because that, too, was foreseeable in the light of
attendant circumstances. Id. at 768.
24 See Tampa Drug Co. v. Wait, 103 So.2d 603 (Fla. 1958). A warning may
be inadequate if it is not sufflciently emphatic. For a more comprehensive discussion of the duty to warn and the adequacy of warning, see Dillard & Hart,
Prnduct Liability: Directions for Use and Duty to Warn, 41 VA. L. REV. 145
(1955).
25
Tamao v. A. P. DeSanno & Son, 209 F.2d 544 (3rd Cir. 1954), Lovejoy
v. Minneavolis Moline Power Implement Co., 248 Minn. 319, 79 N.W.2d 688
(1956): McClanaban v. California Suray-Chemical Corp., 194 Va. 842, 75 S.E.2d
712 (1953). The Court in Post relied on these negligence cases in making its
decision.

required to give adequate directions for use whenever reasonable
care calls for them. 26 However, it must also be pointed out that some
authorities would hold the manufacturer strictly liable for failure to
give adequate warning.27 But all of these authorities agree that in
order to impose strict liability there must be a defect in the manufacturer's product.28 The term defect has "no single definition,"79
but comment h to section 402A of the Restatement of Torts (Second)
states if the manufacturer "has reason to anticipate that danger may
result" from a particular use of the product, ".... he may be required
to give adequate warning of the danger, and a product sold without
such warning is in a defective condition."30 Therefore, strict liability
can be applied to a failure to give an adequate warning.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals in Post apparently chose the
negligence concept as the basis for the defendant's liability. The Court
declared that there is a duty to give a warning proportionateto the
danger of which the manufacturer is aware.31 It further stated that
this duty extends beyond the scope of intended use, and reaches into
2
the field of foreseeable uses.
Although directions to the consumer accompanied the machine,
the Court stated this was not enough: the manufacturer should have
given adequate warning as well as directions for use.3 3 In cases of
this type, the misuse or failure to follow directions may be foreseeable, and the issue of adequacy of warning still exists even if the
directions contain an admonition.
The Court further stated that an adequate warning, for purposes
of contributory negligence standards, is one which is calculated to
attract the user's attention because of its "size, position, and color" 3 4
26

For a more exhaustive discussion of the requirement of adequate directions,

see Noel, Manufacturer'sNegligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Product,
71 YALE
L.J. 816 (1962).
27
See Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1057, 1078-81 (1967).
28
Id.
2
9Traynor, The Watts and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability,

32 TENN.
L. Bxv. 363, 373 (1965).
30

RsTATEMENT OF TORTS (SECOND)

§ 402A, Comment h (1965).

See also

Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. LJ. 5 (1965), where it is
suggested that the test for invoking strict liability can be stated in terms of whether
or not a product is reasonably safe. The determination of this question involves
the balancing of the utility of the risk and the magnitude of the risk. It is suggested that the avoidability of injury through care by the user (including the
effect of instructions or warnings) is a factor.
31437 S.W.2d at 520.
32 Id. at 522.

33 Id.at 520. See also I L FRImEm & M. Fizn~mraw, PaoDucrs Imnsrry
§ 8.05 (1967) wherein the authors distinguish between directions whose purpose
is to insure effective use, and warnings whose purpose is to assure safe use.
34 434 S.W.2d at 521. Commingled with the Court's holding is the issue of
contributory negligence. The Court held the appellant not guilty of contributory
(Continued on next page)
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Furthermore, the warning must adequately convey the true nature
35

of the danger.

Asserting that the majority opinion results from the application
of the doctrine of strict liability without regard to negligence, the
dissent in Post stated that the majority sought to conceal this fact
with the use of "legal jargon in a pretense of applying legal prin36
ciples."
Judicial phraseology has tended to emphasize the element of
foreseeability as the most significant factor upon which liability
turns. 37 The instant case is no different. In determining the limits
of foreseeability, many authorities agree that carelessness and ignorance can be foreseen in some circumstances. 38 Therefore, the courts
and the jury have taken into consideration the character, knowledge,
and special qualities of a product user.30 In so doing, there is a
tendency to hold manufacturers to a higher duty to foresee an
ignorant and careless plaintiff than to anticipate one who has some
degree of skill. 40 Moreover, the manufacturer is required to have
special knowledge of his product in cases involving a failure to
adequately warn about its misuse. 41 Similarly, in order to be able to
foresee the user's behavior, he is required to comprehend and
anticipate the nature and habits of men.42 The extent of the manu-

facturer's foreseeabiity reaches only to the point, however, where
he can reasonably foresee the unintended use of the product.43 This

standard of reasonableness is based upon community customs and
44

usages.

In Post, the manufacturer was well aware of the dangerous quality
of the product, and by its own admission had been trying to perfect
a safety device to prevent such injuries. Thus, it is obvious that the
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

negligence as a matter of law stating that the "gauge" for contributory negligence
must be considered in light of whether the wanin, was suffcient to give him

notice of the degree of danger. The Court stated: '. . . . [A] reasonable person
might hazard violation of an innocuous warning when he would have acted otherwise if the true danger were made known." Id. at 520.
35 Id.
36Id. at 523.
37 68 Wis. L. REV., supra note 2 ,at 229.
38
See Dillard &Hart, supra note 24, at 147.
39
68 Wis. L. Rav., supra note 2, at 236.
40
Noel, supra note 26; see also Keeton, Products Liability-ProblemsPertaining to Proof of Negligence, 19 Sw L.J. 26 (1965). The manufacturer is required
to keep reasonably abreast of the relevant scientific and technical knowledge of his
industry. Id. at 27.
41 Noel, supra note 26, at 847.
42 68 Wis. L. REv., supra note 2, at 240.
43 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (SEcoND) §§ 290, 390 (1965).
44 68 Wis. L. xy., supranote 2, at 232.
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possibility of an injury had been foreseen and adequate warning
should have been provided to the user.
It seems apparent that the Court's opinion in Post rests upon
negligence concepts because it incorporates negligence terms and
cites precedent based upon the concept of negligence. But Post
could also be interpreted as an outgrowth of the theory of strict
liability. Whether strict liability or negligence is the basis does not
alter the outcome: in either case, liability is imposed upon the
jury's determination of inadequate warning.
Underlying the theory of negligence is the fault concept, i.e.,
to the more careless should fall the burden.4 5 Such a rule requires
the parties to be on an equal basis, but in Post, the user and the
manufacturer are being held to different standards. The manufacturer
is charged with a higher degree of care-not to actually foresee
possible harm, but to bear a larger proportion of the risk. This is
the same policy which underlies the concept of strict liability, that
is, the manufacturer is best able to distribute the inevitable losses
to the general public.46 Therefore, the Court seems to be stretching
the concept of negligence in order to apply the policy behind strict
liability.
The dissents assertion that the Court is attempting to conceal
its application of strict liability through the use of "legal jargon"
would thus seem to be apt. Similarly appropriate is the dissents
characterization of this case and strict liability as "another step down
the path of socializing losses." 47 But this danger is not nearly so
alarming as the dissent believes it to be. Tort law has been and will
continue to be largely concerned with the prevention and distribution of losses in a complex and dangerous society 4 8 The distribution
of such losses in a socially acceptable or manageable fashion is
scarcely a legal taboo. A more sophisticated and articulate analysis
of judicial decisions in this area will lead to a more enlightened, and
therefore, a more equitable distribution of those losses which are for
the most part unavoidable. 49
Joseph H. Terry
45 See Isaacs, Fault and Liability, 31 HAuv. L. REv. 954 (1918).
46
See W. PnossER, THE LAw OF TORTS 673 (3rd ed. 1964). See also Morris,
Hazardous Enterprisesand Risk Bearing Capacity, 61 YAr_ L.J. 1172 (1952).

47 437 S.W.2d at 523. See also Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for
Injuries Caused by Defects in Products-An Opposing View, 24 TENN. L. REv.
938 (1957).
48
See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAmEs, THE LAw OF TORTS 1337-41 (1956).
For an exhaustive discussion on "risk distribution" See Calabresi, Some
Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 Y.LE L.J. 499 (1961).

